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Four Years Later: Reconsidering the Original ABA Report on MDP 
Sydney M. Cone, nr 
Synopsis: Reconsidering the original Report issued in 1999 by the ABA Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, this essay suggests that that Report properly attempted to deal with 
potential questions of legal ethics that might arise if the practice of law by lawyers were 
integrated into an enterprise in which non-lawyers had a significant degree of ultimate control, 




questions deeply enough. This essay suggests that more was needed than a proposed mechanism 
for self-certification of compliance with rules of legal ethics coupled with possible review of 
compliance. The "more" that was needed, this essay further suggests, was a proposal for the 
licensing of an enterprise in which lawyers do not have exclusive ultimate control, as a 
precondition to permitting lawyers in the enterprise to offer legal services to the general public. 
Thus, before it could offer legal services to the general public, such an enterprise would need to 
comply with requirements for obtaining a license, and non-compliance with rules of legal ethics 
could bring into play traditional disciplinary measures including, where appropriate, suspension 
or revocation of the license. 
ii 
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I. Introduction 
This essay on multidisciplinary practice (MDP), written from the perspective of 
mid-2003, takes the following questions as its theme: in mid-1999, when the House of Delegates 
of the American Bar Association (ABA) rejected the first proposal of the ABA Commission on 
MDP, 1 what from today's viewpoint was wrong with the Commission's 1999 Report? How, 
redrafted today, might it be usefully recast to deal with MDP? ("MDP" as used herein, 
depending on the context, means either the concept of multidisciplinary practice, or an entity or 
group engaging in multidisciplinary practice, in each case where one of the disciplines is the 
practice oflaw.) 
First, let us take a brief look back. The Commission, which was created in the second 
half of 1998, felt itself effectively under an obligation to submit a proposal for consideration by 
the House of Delegates at its annual meeting in the summer of 1999. The resulting deadline 
called for a Commission report to be available in the late spring of 1999. There were those 
' 
(including the present author) who were of the opinion that this timetable was unrealistic, and 
that it involved a risk that the resulting report would, perforce, be hastily conceived.2 
At the time, there was little doubt that the major accounting firms, then known as the Big 
Five, urged the Commission to propose a form ofMDP that would permit a Big Five firm to 
integrate the practice oflaw,into the firm's activities in a manner permitting the firm to offer 
both legal and non-legal services to its clients.3 The Commission, it would seem, was not 
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indifferent to .. this objective. In any event, its 1999 Report would have permitted the full 
integration of a legal practice into an enterprise engaged in non-legal activities managed by non- 
lawyers. Thus, the 1999 Report would have permitted professionals other than lawyers-and, 
conceivably, non-professional service providers as well-to invest in, and potentially to own and 
control, firms of lawyers offering legal services to the general public.4 
In preparing a proposal that would permit this result, the Commission deemed it 
appropriate to consider how legal rules of professional ethics, particularly the rules on conflicts 
of interest, might be effectively applied to a legal practice as to which non-lawyers would be in a 
position of partial or even dominant control. The Commission apparently felt it imperative to 
take account of the possibility that, through investment or otherwise, non-lawyers might 
influence decisions relating to compliance with applicable rules oflegal ethics once a legal 
practice had been integrated into, for example, one of the Big Five, or some other enterprise in 
Which ultimate decision-making authority did not rest exclusively with members of the legal 
Profession. 
To deal with this possibility, the Commission (in its words) was" particularly mindful" 
that "appropriate safeguards" would be needed to protect the "core values" of the legal 
profession in the context ofMDP. It identified three core values: professional independence of 
judgment, the protection of confidential client information, "and loyalty to the client through the 
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included in its 1999 Report "recommended procedures" for the regulation of an enterprise 
"controlled by non-lawyers" which offered legal services to the public. 
Basing these "recommended procedures" on the jurisdiction exercised by the courts of 
the several states in regulating the legal profession, the 1999 Report made essentially five 
proposals: (1) an MOP not controlled by lawyers would provide the highest court(s) of the 
relevant state(s) with "written undertakings" that the MOP would "establish and maintain 
procedures protecting the independent professional judgment" of its lawyers; (2) annually, the 
managers of the MOP would certify to those courts that the procedures had been observed; (3) if 
it so chose, a court could initiate its own investigation to determine whether the MOP had acted 
in compliance with its undertakings; (4) the cost of administering this mechanism would be met 
by annual certification fees imposed on MOPs; and (5) noncompliance by an MOP "shall be 
subject to withdrawal of its permission to deliver legal services or other appropriate remedial 
measures ordered by the court.t" 
These five proposals for regulating an MOP controlled by non-lawyers are examined in 
more detail below. 
II. The 1999 Report's "Recommended Procedures" 
In the 1999 Report proper, not very many words are devoted to the "recommended 
procedures." The "written undertakings" to be made to the courts by MOPs are briefly described 
on page 3 and, two pages later, the other "recommended procedures" are mentioned in fewer 
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than 100 words. For gloss thereon, one turns to two documents that accompanied the 1999 
Report: a Recommendation setting out a resolution for adoption by the ABA House of 
Delegates-a resolution on which, in the event, the House did not vote; 7 and Appendix A, which 
could have become relevant had the resolution been adopted, setting out "illustrations of possible 
[MDP] amendments to the [ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct." (These documents are 
herein referred to respectively as the "Recommendation" and "Appendix A.") 
The Recommendation and Appendix A convey the impression that the Commission 
seriously intended to safeguard the core values of the legal profession in an MOP controlled by 
non-lawyers. The "written undertakings," destined for signature by an MOP's chief executive 
officer and its board of directors, would have covered, in respect of each lawyer in the MOP, the 
lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment, the lawyer's obligation to segregate 
client funds, and aspects of the lawyer's "unique role ... in society"; and would have required all 
"members of the MOP delivering or assisting in the delivery oflegal services" to abide by rules 
of professional conduct applicable to lawyers. The annual certification of compliance with the 
Written undertakings was to be a formal document filed with the relevant court(s) and delivered 
to each lawyer in the MOP; the MOP was to grant formal approval to the court "to review and 
conduct an administrative audit of the MOP" as the court deemed appropriate; and the MOP was 
to bear the cost of the administrative audit "through the payment ofan annual certification fee.',s 
Finally, the Recommendation repeats the language in the Report (mentioned above) that failure 
by the MOP "to comply with its written undertaking shall be subject to withdrawal of its 
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permission to deliver legal services or to other appropriate remedial measures ordered by the 
court."? 
Both the Recommendation and the illustrative legal professional rules in Appendix A 
dealt with the applicability oflegal rules of professional conduct to an MDP. The 
Recommendation said that a lawyer in an MDP delivering services to the MDP's clients "should 
be bound by the rules of professional conduct" and should not be excused from this obligation 
'I• ~n when acting in accordance with instructions from a non-lawyer supervisor; and that "[a]ll rules 
of professional conduct that apply to a law firm should also apply to an MDP."10 On the 
question of conflicts of interest, the language is quite specific: 
Recommendation: "In connection, with the delivery of legal services, all clients of 
an MDP should be treated as the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflicts of 
interest and imputation in the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm and all 
employees, partners, shareholders or the like were lawyers."!' 
Appendix A: "With respect to an MDP, imputed disqualification of a lawyer 
applies if the conflict in regard to the legal services the lawyer is providing is with 
any client of the MDP, not just a client ofa legal services division of the MDP or 
of an individual lawyer member of the MDP."12 
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The intent of the Commission seems quite clear: to place not only an MDP's lawyers but 
also, for purposes of conflicts of interest, the MDP itself squarely under the legal profession's 
rules of professional ethics. If the MDP, outside its "legal services division" (to use the phrase 
found in Appendix A), were to have a client which,judged by the legal profession's rules on 
conflicts of interest, had interests in conflict with the interests of the client of the "legal services 
division," then the MDP would be required to handle the conflict in accordance with the rules of 
the legal profession. 
Although the implications of this proposal on conflicts of interest are not spelled out in 
the 1999 Report or its accompanying documents, it would seem that the Commission had 
Ventured rather boldly into the sensitive territory of subjecting non-lawyers in an MDP 
(subjecting parts of an MDP other than its "legal services division") to legal professional rules on 
conflicts of interest. The Commission, undoubtedly aware of the sensitivities touched upon by 
this proposal, seems to have decided to let the proposal speak for itself rather than to take on a 
further delicate task of textual exposition. On the other hand, leaving it to the House of 
Delegates to appreciate the implications of technical provisions in the proposal may have caused 
a key aspect of the Commission's work to go largely unexamined. 




the legal profession and to extend the profession's ethical rules to MDPs, why was the House of 
Delegates so hostile to the 1999 Report? In all likelihood, a complete answer does not lie in the 
nuances of this or that provision in the documents prepared by the Commission. Thus, the 
question will be discussed below at two levels. First, what were the special influences at work in 
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mid-1999 in the debate over MDP? They are mentioned in part III below. Second, with the 
benefit of hindsight, how might the 1999 Report have been improved to provide a more 
satisfactory approach to MDP? This is discussed in Part IV below. A common thread in 
answering both questions is that the Commission (or perhaps, more accurately, the leadership of 
the ABA) seems to have acted with undue haste, and could have usefully devoted more. time and 
thought to educating itself, the ABA membership, and the public (including the Big Five) on 
problems inherent in the subject-matter of the 1999 Report. 
III. Special Influences in the 1999 Debate 
For purposes of discussion, two types of participants in the 1999 debate over MDP are 
deemed to have been "special influences": the Big Five (as supported by commentators known 
as the American law and economics school of thought); and legal practitioners and law 






A. The Big Five 
The 1999 Report would have permitted the Big Five, by following a procedure of self- 
certification, to integrate legal practices into their operations and thus to offer legal services to 
their clients. The Big Five did not welcome the 1999 Report, however. On the contrary, shortly 
after it had been released on June 8, 1999, they issued a statement denouncing it.13 This Big Five 
8 
document set out a series of negative conclusions about the 1999 Report, without quoting from it 
or purporting to provide an objective summary of its contents. Some of this document's 
408 
assertions are questionable and given without explanation; e.g., a reference to "draconian 
penalties" that (were the 1999 Report to be adopted) purportedly would flow from "any violation 
of the bar rules by any professional-lawyer or non-lawyer-in the organization [in an MDP]".14 
Given the nature of this statement by the Big Five, only two conclusions will be 
attempted here with respect to the Big Five and the 1999 Report. 
First, the Big Five were opposed to being required to observe the rules on 
conflicts of interest applicable to the legal profession. The Big Five document had this to 
say about making those rules applicable throughout an MDP: "The likely result is that 
firms [presumably, MDPs or firms within MDPs] will have to 'fire' existing clients and 
turn away new ones.''" 
Second, the Big Five were seeking both the right to include legal services in the 
services offered by them to the general public, and freedom from the judicial supervision 
that, in the case of lawyers and law firms, accompanies that right. Although the Big Five 
document did not attempt to reconcile those two objectives, it would seem that their 
position was that only the lawyers within an MDP, but not the MDP itself nor any non- 
lawyers within the MDP with management responsibility for legal services, should be 
subject to judicial supervision." 
9 
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In mid-1999 the Big Five apparently had as their objective the integration of legal 
practices into their general operations without being required to forego the non-legal 
representation of clients where conflicting interests might exist under standards applicable to the 
legal profession, and without being subject to judicial supervision of their practice of law beyond 
judicial supervision of the individual lawyers themselves. Was this objective based on a cost- 
benefit analysis? Had the Big Five calculated that the costs of complying with the 1999 Report 
would outweigh the benefits to be obtained by offering legal services to their clients? Or did the 
Big Five simply miscalculate? In general, did they misjudge howto advance their interests in 
MDP?17 In particular, did they pass up an opportunity to achieve MDP through the relatively 
benign process of self-certification? Under the 1999 Report, the "written undertakings" and the 
annual "certifications" by MDPs would have been generated internally by the MDPs themselves, 
which thus would have enjoyed substantial control over when and how to initiate, shape and 
submit the documents necessary for an int7grated approach to MDP. 
The Big Five were presumably familiar with the American law and economics school of 
thought in this area. This school considers the legal profession's rules to be a form of economic 
protectionism, unduly encumbering free entry of willing sellers oflegal services (such as an 
integrated provider of multiple services) into the marketplace for those services.18 A law and 
economics critique of the 1999 Report might have condemned the proposed extension of the 
legal profession's rules to MDPs, not to mention the "written undertakings" and annual 
"certifications," as barriers burdening access by the Big Five (and other entities) to consumers of 
10 
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legal services, and making it needlessly difficult for consumers to choose among as large a 
variety of potential providers oflegal services as possible. 
In any event, with the Big Five's immediate and sharp rejection of the 1999 Report, a 
potential argument for MDP was weakened as the ABA House of Delegates convened in early 
August 1999. The statement issued by the Big Five in July 1999 undercut the ability of the ABA 
Commission to persuade the ABA House of Delegates that adoption of the 1999 Report would 
bring lawyers working for the Big Five into a system compatible with the Commission's views 
of the proper application of professional rules governing the legal profession. 
B. Defenders of the Legal Profession's Core Values 
Attacking (from quite a different perspective) the integrated version ofMDP espoused by 
the 1999 Report were those lawyers and law professors who saw it as insufficiently protective of 
the legal system, legal ethics, and the fiduciary duties that lawyers owe their clients.19 These 
critics of the 1999 Report were of the view that lawyers are responsible for maintaining the 
professional standards of the legal profession, and, as regards legal practice, lawyers should, 
therefore, be in a position of control that enables them to discharge that responsibility. Some of 
these critics emphasized the professional "culture" needed to nourish respect for the values of the 
legal profession, and questioned· whether the "written undertakings" and annual "certifications" 
called for in the 1999 Report would be adequate to create and maintain the requisite level of 
Professional "culture.v'" Rather, they suggested, the duties of the lawyer are not merely a matter 
11 
411 
of administrative supervision, but involve substantial jurisprudence and learning that the 
"recommended procedures" of the 1999 Report might be inadequate to capture and to instill in 
an MDP controlled by non-lawyers. 
To give concrete expression to these concerns, lawyers in New York State, in July 1999, 
formed a Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation. Its Report of 
some 400 pages, entitled "Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession-The 
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of the ABA debates,21 and provided the New York courts with a basis for adopting rules on 
multidisciplinary practice. These rules do not permit a legal practice to be integrated into an 
entity in which non-lawyers have an ownership or investment interest, or otherwise manage or 
control the legal practice. Rather, the New York rules permit MDP only ifit either (a) involves 
non-legal services controlled by lawyers, ?r (b) consists of "side-by-side" contractual 
arrangements between lawyers and other licensed professionals designed to assure that the legal 
practice maintains its independence.22. 
In common with the ABA Commission, the New York Special Committee worked 
toward a tight deadline; for the New York Special Committee, it was the perceived need to issue 
its Report several weeks prior to the meeting of the ABA House of Delegates in early July 2000. 
As just noted in the preceding paragraph, the New York Special Committee did not attempt to 
devise rules for MDP permitting a legal practice to be integrated into an entity controlled by non- 
lawyers. While the ABA Commission did make the attempt, its proposal was not adopted. Thus, 
12 
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in a sense, the ABA Commission and the New York Special Committee shared a common result; 
both stopped shy of causing rules to be adopted under which a legal practice could be integrated 
into an entity controlled by non-lawyers. Given more time, might the New York Special 
Committee have successfully come to grips with the drafting of rules for the integrated MDP? It 
Would not seem inappropriate to keep this question in mind as hindsight is applied in Part JV 
below to the 1999 Report. 
IV. How Might the 1999 Report Have Been Improved? 
The question, how might the 1999 Report have been improved, will be answered in terms 
of two of its provisions. The first is the proposal in the 1999 Report that the cost of judicial 
supervision of an MDP controlled by non-lawyers would be funded out of"an annual 
certification fee" levied on the MDP.23 The second is the proposal that if an MDP controlled by 
non-lawyers failed to comply with its undertakings, the MDP would be "subject to withdrawal of 
its permission to deliver legal services."24 
A. The 1999 Report's Funding Proposal 
The 1999 Report's funding proposal seems to assume that there would be a correlation 
between the certification fees levied by a given jurisdiction on a given MDP controlled by non-- 
lawyers, and the administrative costs of judicial supervision of that MDP in that jurisdiction. 
The assumption seems rather dubious. The more problematic the MDP, the greater would be the 
13 
413 
costs of supervision. Some MDPs might engender little in the way of administrative supervision, 
while others might raise substantial problems. Supervisory costs, moreover, might vary 
considerably for a given MDP from one jurisdiction to another. The possibility of aggregate fees 
in excess of aggregate costs in a given case might seem a tolerable result, especially from the 
perspective of the budget of the jurisdiction in question, but the opposite result seems open to 
question. Surely it was not intended that when the administrative costs of supervising a given 
MDP reached an amount equal to the fees theretofore paid by that MDP, efforts at judicial 
administration would cease. Nor could it have been intended that an MDP would be able to limit 
judicial surveillance simply by delaying payment of, or defaulting on, the fees it owed. The 
whole funding idea in the 1999 Report, on a moment's reflection, seems fraught with budgetary 
difficulties. 
More importantly, it would seem ~hat if the judicial supervision of MDPs controlled by 
non-lawyers were in the public interest, then the costs of that supervision should be met in the 
same manner that the costs of the judiciary are met generally-in part, at least, out of 
appropriations duly voted by the legislature to fund the judiciary. As a largely ancillary matter, 
if the jurisdiction in question imposed annual fees on lawyers, then lawyers in MDPs would in 
the ordinary course be required to pay those fees.25 Similarly, if entities practicing law in a given 
jurisdiction were required to pay fees, then MDPs practicing law could be slotted into the 
appropriate tariff. 
This matter of funding the administrative costs envisaged by the 1999 Report helps to 
demonstrate the need for deeper inquiry into how the basic objective of the 1999 Report could be 
14 
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better achieved. That basic objective was twofold: to permit legal services to be integrated into 
MDPs controlled by non-lawyers; and to safeguard the core values of the legal profession in 
those MDPs. An improvement on the 1999 Report would be not to trivialize the value of that 
basic objective by approaching it in terms of ancillary and unpredictable revenues from specific 
certification fees. 
Instead, it seems essential to reach, or to reject, a policy decision that the social benefits 
of integrated MDPs justify the costs of subjecting them to judicial supervision. Indeed, unless 
one is willing to reach such a policy decision, there would seem to be little merit in the objective 
sought by the 1999 Report. Those opponents of the 1999 Report who have concluded that MDPs 
controlled by non-lawyers simply do not belong in the legal system are unlikely to be persuaded 
to change their minds because one budgetary approach might be somewhat cheaper than another. 
For their part, members of the law and economics school, while no doubt deplori,ng the cost of 
subjecting integrated MDPs to judicial administration as envisaged by the 1999 Report, have 
Inore radical reasons for promoting unfettered access to the marketplace for legal services. 
Having attempted to accommodate the advocates of the core values of the legal 
Profession, and having, in effect, ignored the radical views of the law and economics school, the 
1999 Report would have been strengthened, as a matter of strategy and substance, had it 
evaluated the benefits of its proposal in societal terms rather than in terms of marginal 
administrative costs. A more complete analysis of societal costs would acknowledge that the 
Proper integration of MDP into the legal system necessitates the availability of judicial resources 
adequate to provide for, first, the meaningful evaluation of applications by MDPs seeking 
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licenses in order to offer legal services to the public, and, second, adequate disciplinary 
supervision of those MDPs once they have been licensed. 
B. "Subject to Withdrawal of its Permission to Deliver Legal Services" 
Given the time pressures on its preparation, the 1999 Report might be forgiven a certain 
lack of acuity on budgetary matters. The same cannot be said, however, when it comes to 
ambiguity regarding the fundamental nature of its "recommended procedures." They essentially 
would authorize an MDP controlled by non-lawyers to certify itself as entitled to offer legal 
services to the general public. The proposed "written undertakings" and the "annual 
certifications" would emanate from the individual MDP. The relevant court would be relegated 
to the role of watching the MDP certify itself as qualified to engage in the practice of law. 
These "recommended procedures" contrast strikingly with the fundamental requirement 
in our society that, in order to offer legal services to the general public, an applicant must first 
satisfy the judiciary that the applicant has the requisite qualifications and meets applicable 
standards, and only on this basis is entitled to be licensed to practice law. Moreover, the license 
is not immutable. For cause, the judiciary has authority to suspend it or to revoke it. 
These fundamentals were dealt with only obliquely by the 1999 Report. They are 
obscured by a convolution in the form of the following key sentence-set out identically in the 
1999 Report itself, in the Recommendation, and in Appendix A: 
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"An MDP that fails to comply with its written undertaking shall be subject to 
withdrawal of its permission to deliver legal services or to other appropriate 
measures ordered by the court."26 
Having self-certified its own "permission" to practice law, the MDP would be at liberty 
to offer legal services to the general public so long as a court did not undertake to try to stop the 
MDP from engaging in the practice oflaw. The MDP would be spared the customary 
requirement of applying for a license to practice law. It would not need a license, or even a 
permit. The phrase "its permission" is without jurisprudential underpinnings (or even, one might 
argue, without grammatical limpidity). The conferring of"its permission" would take place 
somewhere in the shadows of the legal system, not in an established manner involving an 
application to judicial authority for a license, consideration of the application by that authority, 
and a decision by that authority to grant, to deny, or to seek further information in respect of, the 
application. 
This ambiguous approach to entitlement to practice law stands the legal system on its 
head. The burden would be on the judiciary to find out if a self-certified MDP offering legal 
services to the public were not qualified to do so. In the event the judiciary made such a finding, 
it would lack the customary recourse of being able to suspend or revoke a license to practice law, 
because no such license would have been required in the first place. One can even imagine an 
MDP resisting judicial intervention on the ground that, as regards MDPs, the judiciary lacks its 
customary authority over the legal system. The image of a court as plairtiff pursuing an MDP in 
the somewhat murky haze of the key sentence quoted above is less than reassuring. 
17 
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The 1999 Report seems to have gone astray by forgetting the bedrock principle that 
entitlement to practice law, especially to do so by selling legal services to the general public, is 
not a self-conferred right. It is a privilege conferred by society, acting through the judiciary, on 
persons who demonstrate that they meet standards established by the judiciary. Despite the 
protestations of the law and economics school that this privilege has a protectionist aspect 
offensive to the purity of the marketplace, our society continues to view the right to practice law 
as a privilege restricted to applicants who satisfy the judiciary that they possess certain 
qualifications thought necessary to assure adequate professional standards and adequate 
safeguards for the general public. In addition, our society continues to look to the judiciary to 
intervene as necessary to suspend or revoke the privilege thus conferred. 

















Although considerable serious groundwork would be required to prepare the way for the 
licensing ofMDPs, not to create a licensing system for MDPs would be unsustainably 
anomalous if they were to be owned or managed in significant part by persons other than 
licensed legal practitioners, and were to be entitled to offer legal services to the general public. 
As long as our society finds the licensing of the legal profession to be in the public interest (so 
long as, for example, the law and economics school has not persuaded our society to abandon 
regulation in favor of the unregulated marketplace), it would be difficult to justify an exception 
for MDPs which were not licensed to practice law and in which similarly unlicensed owners or 
managers were in positions of authority. 
18 
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Such an exception would result in a bifurcated legal system. It would comprise, on the 
one hand, law firms controlled by legal practitioners whose professional backgrounds and 
activities provide a basis for fulfilling the social duties and obligations of the legal profession 
toward the general public, and not just for exploiting the opportunities for gain available to legal 
practitioners. It would comprise, on the other hand, MDPs that were (in the words of the 1999 
Report) "controlled by non-lawyers," that is, by persons who are divorced from direct judicial 
supervision and whose business interests present the risk that lawyers under their control will at 
times be less than adequately integrated into a legal system with duties and obligations to the 
general public. In the latter case (where neither the MDPs nor their non-lawyer managers would 
have been licensed to offer legal services to the general public), waiving licensing requirements 
for MDPs "controlled by non-lawyers" could be justified only on grounds of expediency-only 
in order to avoid the task of developing rules for the licensing of MDPs. 
The 1999 Report completed much of that task by tying its "recommended procedures" to 
safeguards relating to the core values of the legal profession.27 The 1999 Report stopped shy, 
however, of including the critical step of MDP licensing requirements (possibly because its 
schedule simply did not allow sufficient time for thinking through that step). To take that step, 
one would have to pick up on the rules adumbrated in the 1999 Report (including the 
Recommendation and the illustrative ABA Model Rules in Appendix A),28 and one would have 
to develop new rules with these three objectives: (1) defining an MDP "controlled by non- 
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lawyers", (2) defining the MDP eligible for licensing, and (3) setting out the form and substance 
of an application for the licensing of an MDP. 
A. Defining the MDP "Controlled by Non-Lawyers" 
The 1999 Report created its "recommended procedures" only for MDPs "controlled by 
non-lawyers," and did so because of the perceived need in such MDPs to have safeguards in 
place to protect and preserve the core values of the legal profession, including independent 
professional judgment, loyalty to the client, and avoidance of conflicts of interest.29 Although 
the 1999 Report did not define "controlled by non-lawyers," the rationale of the 1999 Report 
strongly suggests that a definition should be grounded in concern for.maintaining the essential 
values of the legal profession. Put the other way around, the concern is to avoid having those 
values put at risk: When, therefore, non-lawyers in an MDP are in a position to put those values 
at risk, the MDP, under the criteria inherent in the 1999 Report, could be said to be potentially or 
actually "controlled by non-lawyers." 
The potential or actual capacity of non-lawyers in an MDP to put the values of the legal 
profession at risk in the MDP might therefore serve as the touchstone for defining "controlled by 
non-lawyers." This capacity might be inherent in any of a number of factors relevant to the 
management and operations of the MDP. If non-lawyers controlled a valuable trade name used 
by the MDP; if they were in a position to select and refuse clients for whom legal services were 
to be rendered, or to determine which of those clients was to enjoy priority over another; if they 
were in a position materially to influence the resolution of intra-MDP conflicts of interest 
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affecting a client for whom legal services were to be rendered; if they were in a position 
otherwise materially to influence the handling of legal professional matters within the MDP-in 
situations such as these, the MDP, under the criteria inherent in the 1999 Report, could be said to 
be potentially or actually "controlled by non-lawyers." Thus using the 1999 Report, one arrives 
at a pragmatic and prophylactic approach to defining the type of MDP that would be required to 
obtain a license before it could offer legal services to the general public: the MDP in which the 
economic influence or managerial position of one or more non-lawyers might materially affect 
decisions relating to the practice of law or the observance of legal professional rules. 
B. Defining the MDP Eligible for Licensing 
A definition of the MDP eligible for licensing might borrow from (a) the rules adopted in 
New York authorizing MDP through "side-by-side" contractual arrangements, and (b) standards 
observed in Germany for MDP. To try to assure that the service providers within an MDP 
shared compatible attitudes toward clients, the relevant new rule might take the New York 
approach and require that all of the service providers in an MDP must be professionals meeting 
certain standards as to education and enforceable professional rules. In Germany, an even 
stricter standard is imposed, and an MDP is limited to professionals who are under a duty to 
maintain the confidences of their clients. 30 Referring to standards such as these, the new rules 
Would be able to set out criteria for those MDPs eligible for receiving licenses to offer legal 
services to the general public, and would li~it eligibility to MDPs owned and controlled by 
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licensed professionals who were members of professions subject to enforceable disciplinary rules 
found to be sufficiently comparable to the rules governing the legal profession. 
A licensing authority might also take into consideration rules applicable to non-lawyer 
professionals in an MDP, to ascertain whether the MDP is managed in accordance with, and thus 
is eligible for licensing under, those rules. For example, shortly after the 1999 Report was 
issued, the General Counsel, Chief Accountant and Director of Enforcement of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission ("SEC") called to the attention of the ABA the fact that SEC rules on the 
independence of auditors "prohibit an auditor from certifying the financial statements of a client 
with which his firm has an attorney-client relationship.':" These rules would seem to be relevant 
to an MDP seeking to be licensed to offer both auditing and legal services to the general public. 
The licensing of an MDP with respect to legal services might not be the only licensing 
required of the MDP. Where professional services in addition to and other than legal services 









obtained with respect to those additional services. Multiple licensing of the MDP in respect of 
multiple regulated professions would seem altogether appropriate. Any conflicting professional 
rules would have to be resolved; resolution in favor of the strictest rule would often be both 
proper and readily applicable. Examples of multiple licensing can be found in Germany where 





C. The MDP Application for a License 
In applying for a license to offer legal services to the general public, an MDP might 
usefully be required to set out the procedures that it will follow in order to assure the 
independence of its legal professionals, to assure that conflicts of interest throughout the MDP 
are handled in accordance with the conflicts rules applicable to the legal profession, and to assure 
observance of specific rules of the legal profession on, for example, professional training and 
competence, fiduciary obligations toward clients, the handling of client funds, and the lawyer's 
role in the legal system. A requirement along these lines would be compatible with, and would 
help to make truly enforceable, provisions in the 1999 Report aimed at safeguarding the core 
values of the legal profession.33 
Not inconceivably, objections might be raised (as the Big Five objected in 1999) to a 
requirement that the rules of the legal profession on conflicts of interest must be observed 
throughout the MDP offering legal services to the general public.34 Subsequent to the issuance 
of the 1999 Report, however, the political climate may have changed to the point that these 
objections would be viewed with considerable caution.35 Conflicts of interest may now be a 
matter of concern to the point that the procedures and standards applicable in this area to lawyers 
and to law firms might be deemed appropriate for application throughout an MDP offering legal 
services to the general public. 
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An application for licensing of the type just mentioned could provide a licensing 
authority with an adequate basis for reviewing the application, for using its discretion as 
appropriate to seek supplementary information and assurances from the applicant, and for 
approving or disapproving the application. Moreover, in the case of a licensed MDP, traditional 
disciplinary measures could be made available for the purpose of empowering a licensing 
authority to act on any complaints that an MDP had failed to observe applicable rules. Thus, 
licenses could be issued in the usual context in which suspension or revocation would be 
available; and in which civil litigation by complainants might rest on the alleged non-observance 
of applicable standards. 
Achieving this result might well require enabling legislation.36 The process might thus 
entail rigorous legislative groundwork, and might invite public debate over the social value of 
permitting MDPs controlled by non-lawyers t? offer legal services to the general public. The 
outcome of the debate in a given jurisdiction could be adoption or rejection of the proposal. 
Rejection might be on grounds of undue demands on, or added costs of, judicial resources, or 
rejection might occur if the claimed benefits to be derived did not withstand legislative scrutiny. 
Whatever the outcome, the legislative debate could usefully focus on the value of the objective 
being sought, including the value of avoiding a bifurcated legal system. Thus framed, the debate 






ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates 
(Aug. 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdreport.html (hereinafter "the 1999 
Report"). Neither the 1999 Report nor the Recommendation that accompanied it was voted on 
as such, but procedural votes by the ABA House of Delegates on Aug. I 0, 1999 had the effect of 
rejecting the Recommendation "indefinitely." Janet Conley, ABA Postpones Its Decision on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, N.Y. Law J., p. I, col. 4 (Aug. 11, 1999). The "recommended 
procedures" in the 1999 Report, discussed herein, have not been resubmitted to the ABA House 
of Delegates. 
2The 
Commission was created in August 1998 by ABA Pres. Philip S. Anderson, and 
held hearings in Nov. 1998 and Feb. and Mar. 1999. See Background Papers oi;i MDP Issues and 
Developments, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreportOl 99.html Although the 
Report was dated August 1999, it was issued on June 8, 1999. See, e.g., Memorandum thereon 
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/adhocmemo.html (Aug. 4, 1999). The present author is 
also of the view that the 1999 Report was better conceived than the Report prepared by the ABA 
Commission and rejected by the ABA House of Delegates the following year, and that 
improvements on, rather than abandonment of, the 1999 Report might have been more 
productive. See ABA Cornm'n" on Multidisciplinary Practice, House of Delegates Annual 




e.g., Jeffrey E. Garten, Economic Viewpoint, Business Week p. 26 (Aug. 30, 1999). 
The Big Five were Arthur Andersen (since liquidated), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. See also Oral Remarks of Kathryn 
A. Oberly, Vice Chair and General Counsel, Ernst & Young LLP (Feb. 4, I 999), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/oberly2.html 
4The 
1999 Report itself does not confine the service providers in an MDP to lawyers and 
other professionals. The "illustrations" of rules in the Report's Appendix A (tracking§ 3 of the 
Report's Recommendation) defined an MDP in two sentences. The first sentence defined it as an 
entity "that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the 
delivery oflegal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the 
public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services." The second sentence says: "It 
[presumably an MDP as defined in the first sentence] includes an arrangement by which a law 
firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide services, and there is a direct or 
indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement." Since the definition did not restrict the 
term MDP to such an arrangement, the first sentence seemingly included nonprofessionals in the 
scope of "nonlawyers." 
5The 
1999 Report, at 2. On conflicts of interest, see also id, at 4. 
6The 
1999 Report, at 3, 5. On annual certification fees, see Part IV.A infra. On 
"withdrawal of its permission," see Part IV.B infra. 




esp. the Recommendation, § 14 (repeated in Appendix A in illustrative ABA Model 
Rule 5.8(c)). 
9Recommendation, 
§ 15. The same language appears in Appendix A in illustrative ABA 
Model Rule 5.8(d). 
10Recommendation, 
§§ 5-7. In Appendix A illustrative ABA Model Rule 5.8(b) would 
have made legal professional rules generally applicable to lawyers in MDPs. The reference to 
"rules of professional conduct" presumably is to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(hereinafter, the "ABA Model Rules"), which are reproduced in various sources, e.g., 
Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules & Statutes, John S. Dzienkowski, ed. (West 2002- 
03) (hereinafter "Dzienkowski"). 
11Recommendation, 
§ 8. The reference presumably is to, inter alia, ABA Model Rule 
1.7 (Conflict oflnterest: Current Clients); 1.8 (Conflict oflnterest: Current Clients: Specific 
Rules); 1.9 (Duties to Former Clients); 1.10 (Imputation of Conflicts oflnterest: General Rule) 
I ' 
(see Dzienkowski, at 36-64). 
12Appendix A, illustrative Comment (4) to ABA Model Rule 1.10. 
13The 
Big Five statement, distributed in July 1999, was entitled "By Dramatically 
Expanding the Definition of the 'Practice of Law,' the MDP Commission Transforms Bar 
Associations into Super-Regulators with Vast Control over Industries and Organizations Never 




14/d, 7'h bullet point. 
15 Id., 6th bullet point. In her Feb. 4, 1999 Oral Remarks referred to in note 4 supra, the 
Vice Chair and General Counsel of one of the Big Five likewise opposed subjecting an MDP to 
the rules of the legal profession on conflicts of interest. 
16This was the approach advocated in the Oral Remarks referred to in the preceding note. 
17The context of the 1999 debate on MDP may have been changed by enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 on July 30, 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and by the 
issuance thereunder of the Securities and Exchange Commission Release, "Strengthening the 
Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence," 17 CFR Parts 210, 240, 249 and 
274 (Dec. 2, 2002). 
18For a representative article on the American law and economics school of thought in the 
context ofMDP, see Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 Bus. Law. 951 (2000). See 
also Sydney M. Cone, III, Views on Multidisciplinary Practice .... , 36 Wake Forest Law Rev. I, 
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at 5-10 (Spring 2001). 
19See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Professor Bernard Wolfman, Harvard Law School (Mar. 
12, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/wolfman2.html 
200n the need to create a "culture" supportive of strict observance of the legal rules of 
professional conduct, see Steven C. Nelson, lead article, International Law News (Summer 





Special Committee, established by the New York State Bar Association, issued its 
Report in Albany, N.Y. in April 2000. (The present author was a Vice Chair of the Special 
Committee.) 
22The 
rules came into effect on Nov. 1, 2001 as part of the N.Y. Code of Professional 
Responsibility. They are N.Y. Disciplinary Rules 1-106 (non-legal services controlled by 
lawyers) and 1-107 ("side-by-side" contractual arrangements). 
23Recommendation, § 14(i). 
24/d, § 15. 
25Fees 
paid by lawyers may in fact be destined to help defray the costs of disciplinary 
administration and enforcement. See, e.g., ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, Rules 5 and 8 (Dzienkowski, note 10 supra, at 1225 and 1228). However, the fees 
paid by a given lawyer are not earmarked for that lawyer alone, and in the normal course one 
lawyer's fees will be used in respect of administration or discipline of another lawyer. 
26The 1999 Report, at 5; Recommendation,§ 15; Appendix A, illustrative ABA Model 
Rule 5.8(d). 
27 See the text at note 8 supra. 
28See Part II supra. 




New York's requirement, see the Report of the New York Special Committee, note 
21 supra, at 351-52 (MDP should be restricted to lawyers and other professionals who "belong to 
a profession requiring a reasonable degree of higher education and having a set of enforceable 
standards of professional conduct sufficiently comparable with those of lawyers") (this approach 
was given effect in N.Y. Disciplinary Rule 1-107). On Germany, see the same Report, at 250-51 
("the German Parliament limited [integrated] MDPs to those comprising the listed professionals 
(essentially, lawyers, accountants and tax advisers) in order to safeguard rules (such as the rules 
on confidentiality) designed to protect clients of the legal profession"). 
31Letter 
dated July 12, 1999 from the three SEC staff members mentioned in the text to 
Pres. Philip S. Anderson of the ABA. See also the SEC Release cited in note 17 supra. 
32Given 
the possibility of multiple licensing, the 1999 Report seems to have raised a false 
issue when it adverted to the possibility of "a new regulatory body" for MDP. The 1999 Report, 
at 5. On Germany, see the New York Committee Report, note 21 supra, at 237-44. 
33 See Part II supra. 
34See Part III.A supra. 
35See note 17 supra. 
36For 
an unrelated but possibly helpful example of enabling legislation, see N.Y. 
Judiciary Law§ 53(6) (McKinney 1998) ("Nothing contained in this chapter prevents the court 
of appeals from adopting rules for the licensing as a legal consultant, without examination and 
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without regard to citizenship, of a person [meeting certain criteria]"), introduced in Mar. 1973 
and adopted by the N.Y. State Legislature and signed into law in Mar.-Apr. 1974. 
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